Cyber, spectrum, and routing

The Open Observatory of Network Interference is a global volunteer measurement network that tests for blocked websites, throttled services, deep-packet-inspection events, and middlebox interference. The list below ranks countries by their 30-day anomaly rate (the share of probes that returned an anomalous response). Click into any country for the full per-app and per-category breakdown.

• TKMTurkmenistan
  100.0%

  105 probes
• CHNChina
  65.0%

  1,204,526 probes
• IRNIran
  41.4%

  563,007 probes
• RUSRussia
  30.0%

  7,413,339 probes
• GABGabon
  22.8%

  5,794 probes
• YEMYemen
  21.1%

  59,279 probes
• MMRMyanmar
  15.3%

  182,820 probes
• TZATanzania
  14.4%

  170,054 probes
• VENVenezuela
  13.5%

  2,810,672 probes
• SYRSyria
  12.5%

  136,091 probes
• OMNOman
  11.6%

  15,682 probes
• PAKPakistan
  11.2%

  213,542 probes
• AFGAfghanistan
  9.9%

  47,107 probes
• MLIMali
  9.7%

  72 probes
• DJIDjibouti
  9.3%

  606 probes

BGP leaks happen when an autonomous system announces routes it should not have advertised; hijacks are claims of address space owned by another network. Both result in traffic redirection on the underlying internet. SENTINEL surfaces leaks and hijacks tracked by Cloudflare Radar.

The MISP galaxy taxonomy catalogues named threat actors (APT groups, financially motivated criminal groups, hacktivist collectives) by attributed sponsor country. Click into any country to see its full per-actor table on the dossier page.

• CHNChina214 groups
• RUSRussia79 groups
• IRNIran60 groups
• PRKNorth Korea26 groups
• PSEPalestine9 groups
• TURTurkey7 groups
• UKRUkraine6 groups
• VNMVietnam6 groups
• INDIndia5 groups
• USAUnited States5 groups
• ISRIsrael5 groups
• PAKPakistan4 groups
• BRABrazil4 groups
• LBNLebanon4 groups
• BLRBelarus4 groups
• NGANigeria3 groups
• IDNIndonesia3 groups
• KORSouth Korea2 groups
• TUNTunisia2 groups
• AREUnited Arab Emirates2 groups

GPS jamming is rendered live as a hex-bin heatmap on the globe; spoofing surfaces as discrete events on the patterns rail. Both feeds are too high-resolution to enumerate here usefully, but the categorical state across the major flashpoints is steady: persistent interference around Russia, Iran, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Israel, with intermittent step-changes around active strike windows.

The spoof classifier looks for the spurious-position signature where multiple aircraft simultaneously report a fix at the same impossible coordinate. Receiver-handoff false positives in mid-Atlantic and mid-Pacific coverage gaps are filtered.

The cyber tab on the live globe carries the four data feeds above with full per-country drill-down, BGP timeseries graphs, OONI 30-day anomaly trends, and a threat-actor table. The country panel on each country page (axonia.us/<iso>) summarises the same data per-country.